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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellant : 
v. : 
LINDA MARJORIE FULLER : Case No. 990930-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellee : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal, by the State, from an order quashing a bind over and dismissing 
an Information that charged Appellee Linda Marjorie Fuller with forgery, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-501 (1999), and theft by 
deception, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-405 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated section 77-18a-1 (2)(a) 
(1999) which allows the State to appeal from "a final judgment of dismissal^]nI 
*In the caption of its brief, the State lists this appeal as having second priority for 
oral argument purposes. But, because Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(b) does not assign 
a priority number to State's appeals from orders of dismissal, this appeal has lowest 
priority under subsection (15) of that rule. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-501(1) (1999) defines forgery as uttering a 
check "with purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he [or she] is facilitating 
a fraud." The evidence showed that Ms. Fuller cashed a $300 check for upholstery work 
which she performed, the check later turned out to be stolen and forged, Ms. Fuller could 
not remember who gave her the check 15 months after receiving it, and she had no 
license for her upholstery business. Does this evidence support a reasonable inference 
that Ms. Fuller knew of the forgery? 
"The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a 
question of law" which this Court reviews without deference to the trial court. State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9,1j 8, 20 P.3d 300. This issue is preserved at R. 19-25; 77: 38-40; 78.2 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-501 (1999) provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to 
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud 
to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without 
his authority or utters any such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, 
2Volume 77 contains the preliminary hearing transcript. Volume 78 contains the 
transcript on the hearing to quash the bind over. The internal page numbers of those 
volumes are listed after "R." and the volume number. 
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authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes or utters 
any writing so that the writing or the making, 
completion, execution, authentication, issuance 
transference, publication or utterance purports to 
be the act of another, whether the person is 
existent or nonexistent, or purports to have been 
executed at a time or place or in a numbered 
sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be 
a copy of an original when no such original 
existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, 
electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording valuable information including forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit 
cards, badges, trademarks, money and any other 
symbols of value, right privilege, or 
identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other 
instrument or writing issued by a government or 
any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or 
any other instrument or writing representing an 
interest in or claim against property, or a 
pecuniary interest in or claim against any person 
or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Annotated 76-6-405 (1999) defines the crime of theft by deception: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
control over property of another by deception and with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when 
there is only falsity as to matters having no pecuniary 
significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in 
communications addressed to the public or to a class or group. 
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: 
"No person sha l l . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law[.]" 
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Article One, section seven of the Utah Constitution similarly provides that "No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
Article One, section 12 of the Utah Constitution similarly provides in pertinent 
part: "In criminal prosecutions . . . [t]he accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself[.]ff 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 31, 1998, the State charged Ms. Fuller with the crimes of forgery and theft 
by deception. R. 2. The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on May 27,1999. R. 
77. The trial court found sufficient evidence to bind the case over for trial on both 
charges. R. 77:41. 
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On August 5, 1999, Ms. Fuller filed a motion to quash the bind over. R. 19. The 
State did not respond to the motion. R. 64. The trial court conducted a hearing on the 
motion on September 13, 1999. R. 78. The hearing judge quashed the bind over and 
dismissed the charges. R. 22. The hearing judge filed a written order of dismissal on 
October 14, 1999. R. 64-67. The State filed a notice of appeal on October 28, 1999. R. 
69. 
On March 30,2000, the State filed its opening brief on appeal. On April 7, 2000, 
Ms. Fuller filed a motion to hold this appeal in abeyance and to stay the briefing schedule 
pending the Utah Supreme Court's deliberations in the consolidated cases, State v. Clark, 
No. 990368, and State v. Smith, No. 990798. This Court granted the motion on April 21, 
2000. The Utah Supreme Court decided Clark and Smith on February 6, 2001. This 
Court then reinstated the briefing schedule in this appeal on April 18, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Between the end of March of 1997 and April 6, 1997, Steven Allred was helping 
his mother move when he unknowingly threw numerous of his personal checks into a 
dumpster. R. 77: 20-22. On April 8, 1997, Ms. Fuller entered the Bank One branch at 
1295 South and Redwood Road in Salt Lake City and presented a cash for $300 for 
cashing. R. 77: 5-6. The check was drawn from Mr. Alfred's account at Bank One, 
included a signature that purported to be Mr. Alfred's, and was payable to Ms. Fuller. R. 
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77: 6. In the space provided for describing any notations relating to the check was written 
"upholstery." R.78:21. 
Ms. Fuller indorsed the check in the bank teller's presence and presented a valid 
Utah Driver's License. R. 77: 8, 11. The teller compared Ms. Fuller's indorsement on 
the check with the signature on the driver's license and found that they matched. R. 77: 
8-9. Because Ms. Fuller did not have an account at Bank One, the teller requested Ms. 
Fuller to place a clear fingerprint on the check and Ms. Fuller willingly complied. R. 77: 
7,9. 
The teller inspected Mr. Allred's account and found that it contained sufficient 
funds to cash the check. R. 77: 9-10. Additionally, the bank's computer system gave no 
indication that the check was invalid in any way. R. 77: 10. Ms. Fuller acted calmly and 
the teller believed that the transaction was entirely normal. R. 77: 9. Accordingly, the 
teller gave Ms. Fuller $300 in cash. R. 77: 6. 
About 45 minutes later, another person entered the bank and cashed one of Mr. 
Allred's missing checks. R. 77: 34. According to Mr. Allred, he lost between 50 to 100 
of his personal checks. R. 77: 24. None of these other checks, including the one cashed 
just after Ms. Fuller entered the bank, were linked to her in any way. R. 77: 24, 34. 
Six days later, Bank One notified Mr. Allred that his account was overdrawn. R. 
77: 23. He then realized for the first time that he had mistakenly discarded the checks. 
Mr. Allred did not know Ms. Fuller, he did not fill out the check or sign his name, nor did 
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he authorize anyone else to do so. R. 77: 21. 
Fifteen months after the cashing of the check, police detective Brent Gruber 
telephoned Ms. Fuller at her home. R. 77: 27, 30-32. Ms. Fuller cooperated with Det. 
Gruber, informed him that she remembered cashing the check, and stated that the check 
was payment for her work upholstering a sofa. R. 77: 28, 30-34. Ms. Fuller indicated 
that she could not remember the man who had given her the check, she probably could 
not identify him, and she had no identifying information about him. R. 77: 28-29, 36. 
She only remembered that "they" drove a truck. R. 77: 33. Ms. Fuller added that she did 
not have a business license for her upholstery activities. R. 77: 32-33. 
After speaking with Ms. Fuller, Det. Gruber confirmed that Ms. Fuller did not 
have a business license but he conducted no further investigation. R. 77: 33. Based on 
his investigation, Det. Gruber recommended Ms. Fuller's arrest. R. 77: 32-34. The 
district attorney agreed and charged Ms. Fuller with forgery and theft by deception. R. 2; 
77: 32. 
The trial court conducted a preliminary hearing and bound Ms. Fuller over for 
trial. R. 77:41. Ms. Fuller challenged the bind over in a motion to quash. R. 19. She 
contended that the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that she knew of the 
forgery or that she intended to defraud anyone. R. 22. The State did not respond to the 
motion. R. 64. 
The trial court conducted a hearing and granted the motion to quash. R. 78: 22-24. 
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The hearing judge rejected the State's contention that "the fact that Ms. Fuller doesn't 
appear to be in the upholstery business and cannot identify a customer is enough to get it 
bound over." R. 78: 8. Instead, the judge concluded that these facts amounted to 
"speculation . . . not credible evidence" that Ms. Fuller knew of the forgery. R. 78: 10. 
Even viewing the evidence "in the most favorable light, and . . . giving the State every 
benefit," the hearing judge ruled that the State presented "a dearth of facts that support 
anything resembling intent." R. 78: 22-23. If anything, the lack of a business license and 
Ms. Fuller's inability to remember a customer were consistent with persons who operate 
unlicensed, small-scale businesses that have irregular clientele. R. 78: 10, 23-24. The 
hearing judge concluded that the State only presented "nothing more than a suspicion 
articulated by a[] [police] officer based on inadequate or a skimpy investigation, but a 
suspicion, no evidence." R. 78: 23. The State appealed the hearing judge's decision to 
this Court. R. 69. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence fails to establish probable cause that Ms. Fuller knew of the forgery 
or had an intent to defraud. The Utah Supreme Court recently held that to establish 
probable cause the State must present evidence from which a reasonable belief can be 
inferred that the defendant committed a crime. Here, the evidence showed Ms. Fuller's 
innocence. She cashed a check truthfully representing herself to be the payee, she was 
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not nervous, she willingly provided valid identification and gave a fingerprint, the 
account had sufficient funds, and the check appeared valid. Even the teller admitted that 
the transaction appeared entirely normal. 
The State argued that it had established probable cause because: (1) Ms. Fuller 
could not remember the man who gave her the check 15 months after he had paid for 
upholstery work she had performed; and, (2) she did not have a business license to do 
upholstery work. These facts may show a faded memory and poor business acumen but 
do not indicate knowledge of the forgery. If anything, these facts support Ms. Fuller's 
innocence. Specifically, the check included a notation that the payment was for 
upholstery work and unlicensed business people commonly have irregular clientele and 
do not keep records. The only way to infer guilt would require an assessment of Ms. 
Fuller's credibility which the law plainly forbids in determining probable cause. 
Contrary to the State's claims, guilt cannot be inferred from the mere possession of 
a stolen, forged check under Utah case law. In State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9,20 P.3d 300, 
the Utah Supreme Court specifically declined to address the merits of the State's mere 
possession argument. The most this Court can draw from Clark is that the facts of that 
case supported probable cause. But, this case is clearly distinguishable from Clark. 
Contrary to that case, Ms. Fuller gave no indication that she knew of the forgery and she 
had no connection to the theft of the checks in any way. Even the case law prior to Clark 
fails to support the State's claim. 
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Inferring guilt from possession alone also violates numerous principles of criminal 
law as well as fundamental constitutional rights. Under Utah law, intent cannot be 
inferred from conduct alone. Further, basing probable ceiuse on mere possession would 
allow the State to charge any person in a check's chain of custody with a crime. This 
approach would also defeat the presumption of innocence, shift the burden of proof to the 
defense, compel defendants to forfeit their right to silence to explain the possession, and 
create a strict liability offense. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 
CAUSE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT A REASONABLE BELIEF THAT MS. 
FULLER KNEW OF THE FORGERY, THE MERE 
POSSESSION OF A STOLEN, FORGED CHECK DOES 
NOT SUPPORT GUILTY KNOWLEDGE, AND, IN ANY 
EVENT, SUCH AN INFERENCE VIOLATES BASIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Based on the cursory evidence presented below, no reasonable inference can be 
drawn that Ms. Fuller knew of the forged check and that she intended to defraud the bank. 
Under the relevant case law, the State cannot support its argument that the mere 
possession of a stolen, forged check establishes probable cause of guilt. In any event, 
basic constitutional rights bar the State from relying on possession alone to supply the 
requisite knowledge and intent for the crimes of forgery and theft by deception. 
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A. The Cursory Evidence Does Not Establish a 
Reasonable Inference that Ms. Fuller Knew of 
the Forgery 
The hearing judge correctly concluded that the State failed to establish probable 
cause that Ms. Fuller knew of the forgery. In fact, the reasonable inferences drawn form 
the evidence indicate that Ms. Fuller was an innocent victim. 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must establish probable cause that a 
crime has been committed and that the defendant committed it. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226,1229 (Utah 1995); Utah R. Crim. Proc. 7(h)(2). "In making a determination as to 
probable cause, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." Pledger, 
896 P.2d at 1229. Magistrates may not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of 
witnesses, but must leave these tasks to the trier of fact at trial. State v. ClarL 2001 UT 9, 
^ 10, 20 P.3d 300. Although the magistrate's role is limited, it "is not that of a rubber 
stamp for the prosecution.'" Id (quoting State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, % 7, 3 P.3d 
725). Rather, the magistrate must "ensure that all 'groundless and improvident 
prosecutions' are ferreted out no later than the preliminary hearing." Hester, 2000 UT 
App 159, K 7, 3 P.3d 725 (quoting State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980)). 
The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for establishing probable 
cause at preliminary hearings. In Clark, the Supreme Court reviewed its case law and 
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concluded that it had rendered confusing decisions on the level of proof required to bind a 
case over for trial. 2001 UT 9, ffi[ 11-14,20 P.3d 300. The Supreme Court clarified that 
the quantum of evidence was the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id at ^  16. 
Specifically, the State must show sufficient evidence "to support a reasonable belief that 
an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id at % 16. 
Although the evidence plainly shows a forgery occurred, the State failed to meet 
its burden of establishing a reasonable inference that Ms. Fuller had knowledge of the 
forgery or had an intent to defraud. The crime of forgery required the State to show that 
Ms. Fuller uttered the check Mwith purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he 
[or she] [was] facilitating a fraud[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1) (1999). Rather than 
showing such knowledge or intent, she represented to be no one other than herself when 
Ms. Fuller cashed the check. Moreover, she indorsed her own name, produced a valid 
Utah driver's license, and willingly affixed her fingerprint on the check. 
Likewise, as the teller stated, the presentment of the check raised no suspicions 
and appeared to be a normal transaction. Ms. Fuller was not nervous and she fully 
cooperated with the teller's requests, including willingly indorsing the check and 
providing a fingerprint. The indorsement on the check matched the signature of Ms. 
Fuller's driver's license. The account contained sufficient funds and there was no 
indication in the bank's computer system that the check was invalid. In fact, the teller 
first learned of a problem with the check when she was subpoenaed months after the 
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transaction. 
As the State conceded below, the only evidence from which knowledge or intent 
could possibly be inferred was Ms. Fuller's failure to remember who gave her the check 
and the fact that she did not have a business license. R. 78: 7-8. Ms. Fuller's inability to 
remember a person that she met one time 15 months previously is, at best, inconclusive. 
Further, as the hearing judge concluded, persons who operate small-scale businesses out 
of their homes commonly do not have regular clientele and do not obtain business 
licenses. Antique dealers, collectors, and crafters readily come to mind. As the hearing 
judge ruled, this evidence is simply too "skimpy" upon which to base probable cause. R. 
78: 24. 
In imputing knowledge of the forgery to Ms. Fuller, the State simply speculated 
below about Ms. Fuller's motives and responses to Det. Gruber's questions. Although the 
absence of business records and a business license may show Ms. Fuller is a poor 
business person, they do not reasonably indicate knowledge of the specific forgery here. 
To infer such knowledge would require a conclusion that Ms. Fuller lacked credibility. 
But, when determining probable cause to bind a case over, courts cannot consider 
credibility issues. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10, 20 P.3d 300. Rather, they must objectively 
view the evidence to determine whether a reasonable belief exists that a person 
committed a crime. Id. at ^  16. Because the evidence here reasonably supports Ms. 
Fuller's innocence rather than her guilt, the State failed to meet its burden of proof for 
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forgery. Similarly, the State's failure to show knowledge of the forgery prevented it from 
establishing probable cause of a "purpose to deprive" a person of property as required for 
the crime of theft by deception. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405(1) (1999). 
B. Guilty Knowledge Cannot Be Inferred from 
the Mere Presentment of a Stolen, Forged 
Check 
On appeal, the State contends that the mere presentment of a stolen, forged check 
reasonably shows criminal knowledge. State's brief at 8 (citing State v. Kihlstrom. 1999 
UT App 289, % 13, 988 P.2d 949). But, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Clark 
casts doubt on this assertion. In that case, the Supreme Court noted this Court's 
conclusion in Kihlstrom that State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985), stood for the 
proposition that "'a person who merely utters a forged instrument can be inferred to have 
had knowledge of the forgery.'" Clark. 2001 UT 9, If 18 n,4,20 P.3d 300 (quoting 
Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App 289, J 13, 988 P.2d 949)). In both Williams and Kihlstrom. the 
evidence merely showed that the defendants cashed checks that some unknown persons 
had stolen and forged and that the owners of the checks did not know the defendants nor 
authorize anyone to make checks payable to them. Williams. 712 P.2d at 223; Kihlstrom. 
1999 UT App 289, ffi[ 14,988 P.2d 949. The appellants in Clark urged the Supreme 
Court to overrule Williams and Kihlstrom. Clark. 2001 UT 9, ^ 18 n.4, 20 P.3d 300. 
The Supreme Court neither reaffirmed nor overruled Williams. Instead, it simply 
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noted the parties' requests to elucidate on that opinion and stated that M[w]e decline the 
invitation to reconsider Williams." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 18 n.4, 20 P.3d 300. 
Given the ambiguous status of Williams and Kihlstrom's interpretation of it, the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Clark appears to define the current state of the law. That 
case is clearly distinguishable from Ms. Fuller's conduct. In Clark, both defendants 
cashed checks that had been stolen and forged on the same day that the defendants 
presented them at a bank. 2001 UT 9, ffl 3, 6, 20 P.3d 300. When both defendants 
realized that a problem with the accounts existed, they left the bank without explanation, 
leaving the checks behind. Id. at ffij 4, 6. The Supreme Court concluded that, "in light of 
the timing," these facts led to the reasonable inference that defendants "either stole the 
checks or knew they were stolen." Id. at <| 20. 
Here, the checks were stolen at least two days and possibly more than a week 
before Ms. Fuller cashed the check. R. 77: 20-22. Further, although up to 100 checks 
were stolen, none of them were ever linked to Ms. Fuller during the 15 months after the 
theft. Thus, contrary to the defendants in Clark, the "timing" of the theft does not 
reasonably connect Ms. Fuller to the forgery. Clark. 2001 UT 9, f 20, 20 P.3d 300. 
Likewise, contrary to the circumstances in Clark. Ms. Fuller's actions and 
demeanor did not indicate knowledge of the forgery. As the bank teller confirmed, Ms. 
Fuller fully cooperated, she was not nervous, and her behavior raised no suspicions. 
Moreover, the account had sufficient funds, there was no hold placed on the check, and 
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the transaction appeared completely routine. There was, thus, no reasonable basis for 
inferring that Ms. Fuller knew anything about the theft or the forgery. 
Even if Williams applied, that case does not support a finding of probable cause in 
this case. That appeal involved a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In 
considering the evidence supporting a conviction, appellate courts conduct a highly 
deferential review of the evidence and reverse a conviction only "when the evidence is so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable" that reasonable persons must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994). In contrast, in reviewing decisions to bind cases over for trial, no deference is 
given the trial court and appellate courts conduct a de novo review. Clark, 2001 UT 9, J^ 
8, 20 P.3d 300. Given the deference afforded the jury verdict in Williams, that case has 
limited applicability here. 
C. Fundamental Constitutional Rights Require 
Evidence of the Defendant's Mental State 
Regardless of the current state of the law, allowing guilt to be inferred from the 
mere possession of a stolen, forged check undermines essential, fundamental rights of the 
accused. First, inferring guilt from mere possession violates the well-settled principle that 
a criminal act itself cannot supply the required mental state for a crime: 
The conduct of the defendant... cannot be taken alone to find 
the defendant guilty absent the concomitant intent to achieve the 
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conscious objective "The law does not presume, because an 
assault was made with a weapon likely to produce death, that it 
was an assault with the intent to murder. And where it takes a 
particular intent to constitute a crime, that particular intent must 
be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, which 
would warrant the inference of the intent with which the act was 
done." [Thacker v. Commonwealth, 114 S.E.2d 504, 505 (Va. 
1922).] 
This Court has in the past acknowledged the fact that 
criminal intent is seldom proved by direct evidence but must be 
instead inferred from the circumstances of the given facts. 
Nonetheless, we have also cautioned that the act in itself does 
not raise the presumption that it was done with the specific 
intent required to prove the offense. All the circumstances, 
when taken together, must admit of no other reasonable 
hypothesis than that of guilt to warrant conviction. State v. 
Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 (1980), and cases cited therein. 
State v. Castonguav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). 
Numerous courts have specifically applied these principles to the possession of a 
forged check and have concluded that the "act of passing as true an instrument is not one 
from which guilty knowledge can be inferred." Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 102 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1972).3 Such evidence might include an alteration on the check, a name 
or signature that does not match, the defendant's suspicious demeanor, or taking the 
check for less than its value. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App. 289, ^  12, 988 P.2d 949. 
3See also State v. Maxwell, 391 P.2d 560, 562 (Ariz. 1964); Heath v. State, 382 
So. 2d 391, 392 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Martin, 341 N.W.2d 728, 730-31 (Iowa 
1983); State v. Tomlinson, 457 So. 2d 651,654 (La. 1984); State v. Phillips, 412 P.2d 
205, 208 (Mont. 1966); Taylor v. State, 88 P.2d 665,669 (Okla. Crim. App. 1939); State 
v. Allegra, 533 A.2d 338, 343 (N.H. 1987); People v. Mathis, 630 N.Y.S.2d 793, 794 
(App. Div. 1995); State v. Mulholland, 300 A.2d 271,272 (R.I. 1973); State v. Ravenna, 
557 A.2d 484,485 (Vt. 1988); State v. Scobv, 810 P.2d 1358,1362 (Wash. 1991). 
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Second, if mere possession could sustain a forgery conviction, anyone in the 
check's chain of possession would be guilty of a crime. Id at ^  11. A person who, for 
example, accepts a forged check at a yard sale could be convicted of forgery if possession 
alone were sufficient. Id. at ^ f 10 n. 5. Protecting persons from unjust prosecutions is 
particularly appropriate with respect to negotiable instruments. Millions of checks are 
passed everyday to transact business and to pay debts. Citizens routinely accept and pass 
these checks without ever assessing the checks' validity. 
Third, inferring guilt from mere possession defeats an accused person's right to a 
presumption of innocence. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App. 289, % 10 n. 5,988 P.2d 949. "The 
principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused . . . is axiomatic 
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law.,f Coffin v. United States. 156 U.S. 432,453 (1895). Inferring guilt from 
the mere possession of a forged check essentially eliminates the presumption because the 
inference creates a presumption itself that the holder of the check knew of the forgery. 
Checks are distinguishable from other types of property such as cars that, if stolen, 
create a presumption that the possessor knew or should have known of the theft. See, 
e.g.. State v. Graves, 717 P.2d 717, 717-18 (Utah 1986) (can presume criminal intent 
from possession of a stolen car). In contrast to other property, checks are widely used 
and accepted and are routinely exchanged to transact business. For these very reasons, 
the law of commercial transactions establishes a presumption of innocence for persons 
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who take a check in good faith, for value and without notice of any defect in the 
instrument. Those persons are regarded as holders in due course and can rely on the 
validity of the check. Jaeger and Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 433 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1967). 
Thus, "in the absence of anything to warn him [or her] to the contrary, [a holder in due 
course] may assume that persons with whom he deals are themselves acting honestly and 
in good faith." Id But, allowing an inference of guilt from simple possession grants a 
holder in due course more protection from civil liability than a criminal defendant would 
enjoy from criminal prosecution. 
Fourth, just as with the presumption of innocence, inferring guilt from the mere 
possession of a forged check shifts the burden of proof to the accused. Kihlstrom, 1999 
UT App 289, «J 10 n. 5, 988 P.2d 949. Requiring the State to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt is "indispensable" to "safeguarding] [citizens] from dubious and unjust 
convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and property.'" In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (quoting Davis v. United States. 160 U.S. 469,488 (1895)). But, 
when the trier of fact may presume that a person possessing a forged check knows of the 
forgery, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. State v. Ravenna, 557 A.2d 484, 485 
(Vt. 1988). 
Fifth, inferring guilt in this manner "chill[s] the defendant's Fifth Amendment 
privilege" to remain silent. Kihlstrom. 1999 UT App 289, Tf 10 n. 5,988 P.2d 949. 
Defeating the presumption of innocence and shifting the burden of proof essentially 
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compels criminal defendants to forfeit their right to remain silent to explain the 
circumstances of receiving a forged check and to prove their innocence. IcL Such was the 
case here when Ms. Fuller attempted to explain the circumstances of her receiving the 
check and then the State inferred guilt from her responses. The right to remain silent was 
"enshrined11 in the Constitution to protect the accused from involuntary confessions and 
entrapping the unwitting. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,442-43 (1966). 
Although there may be some logical appeal to requiring persons in possession of a 
forged check to explain how they received it, the dangers of doing so are well-
established: 
[I]f an accused person be asked to explain his apparent 
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with 
which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial 
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to 
browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a 
corner, and to entrap him into a fatal contradictions... demand 
for its total abolition. 
Miranda. 384 U.S. at 442-43. As this case illustrates, the temptation for coercion is 
particularly strong in cases such as a forged check because the forgery provides 
conclusive proof that a crime has been committed. 
Sixth, the inference of guilt "create[s] the danger that the unknowing and 
accidental passing of a forged instrument could effectively become a strict liability 
offense." Parks v. State. 746 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). It is "universal 
and persistent in mature systems of law" that due process generally forbids a person from 
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being convicted of a crime absent criminal intent. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 250 (1952). The only exceptions to this principle concern public welfare offenses or 
crimes that carry only small fines. Id. at 253-56. The crimes of forgery, a third degree 
felony, and theft by deception, a crime punishable up to a year in jail here, fall under 
neither of those categories. 
The preservation of these fundamental constitutional rights hinges on requiring the 
State to present evidence of criminal intent to convict a person of forgery for attempting 
to cash a forged check. Both the State and Federal Constitutions require as much. See 
U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7,12. Given the wide acceptance and 
use of checks, innocent persons will be convicted and imprisoned absent these 
protections. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Fuller requests this Court to uphold the hearing judge's decision to quash the 
bind over and to dismiss the forgery charge. 
SUBMITTED this JJ^ day of May, 2001. 
o>^y 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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